The Problem with Utility: Towards a Non-Consequentialist / Utility Theory Synthesis

I develop the argument that our current decision-making framework, utility theory, when used by itself, is 1) descriptively incomplete, 2) theoretically flawed, and 2) ethically questionable. In response, I offer an exploratory framework that incorporates both consequentialist and non-consequentialist motivations. Adding a commitment function provides a synthesis which remedies the problems associated with the sole use of utility theory. Finally, I show how philosophers Immanuel Kant, W.D. Ross, and Martin Buber provide an ethical basis for the framework.

The Problem with Utility: Towards a Non-Consequentialist / Utility Theory Synthesis

I develop the argument that our current decision-making framework, utility theory, when used by itself, is 1) descriptively incomplete, 2) theoretically flawed, and 2) ethically questionable. In response, I offer an exploratory framework that incorporates both consequentialist and non-consequentialist motivations. Adding a commitment function provides a synthesis which remedies the problems associated with the sole use of utility theory. Finally, I show how philosophers Immanuel Kant, W.D. Ross, and Martin Buber provide an ethical basis for the framework

Department of Economics Working Paper Series Preferences, cooperation, and Institutions

We examine the link between social institutions and individuals ’ propensity to cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework. To begin, we transform the usual prisoner’s dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material preferences. By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on expected partner behavior. All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis. As such it represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts. Exogenous social policy can affect cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if preferences are endogenous. Repeated play results in ”switching ” behavior, where formerly cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform). This behavior suggests further roles for institutions. Finally, continuing the effort to analyze community, we add the possibility of interaction with a new ”low cost ” player who, it is known, does not make social investments

Preferences, cooperation, and Institutions

We examine the link between social institutions and individuals' propensity to cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework. To begin, we transform the usual prisoner's dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material preferences. By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on expected partner behavior. All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis. As such it represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts. Exogenous social policy can affect cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if preferences are endogenous. Repeated play results in "switching" behavior, where formerly cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform). This behavior suggests further roles for institutions. Finally, continuing the effort to analyze community, we add the possibility of interaction with a new "low cost" player who, it is known, does not make social investments.Non-material, endogenous preferences; cooperation; institutions.

Preferences, cooperation, and Institutions

We examine the link between social institutions and individuals\u27 propensity to cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework. To begin, we transform the usual prisoner\u27s dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material preferences. By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on expected partner behavior. All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis. As such it represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts. Exogenous social policy can affect cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if preferences are endogenous. Repeated play results in switching behavior, where formerly cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform). This behavior suggests further roles for institutions. Finally, continuing the effort to analyze community, we add the possibility of interaction with a new low cost player who, it is known, does not make social investments